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This article covers the last phase of the Ottoman Empire: the Abdul Hamid II's reign from 
1876 to 1908 and the Young Turks period from 1908 until the dissolution of the Empire.
At the beginning of the period under consideration, the Ottoman economy – scarce in la-
bour and capital, rich in land – was open to world capitalism and its specialization in agri-
culture had advanced considerably1. This was the result of a season of reforms (Tanzimat) 
enacted by the Ottoman government since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, 
with the aim  of modernizing and centralizing the Empire following the example of West-
ern institutions.
The Great Powers supported these reforms as long as they paved the way to the opening 
of the Empire to foreign trade and investment and in exchange for their promise to sup-
port Ottoman territorial integrity and political sovereignty. In the same period, however, 
the Ottoman Empire was experiencing a severe deterioration of its finances that led to a 
slowdown in the implementation of the reform policy and exposed the state to progressive 
territorial losses. At the same time, the surrender of some of the richest provinces of the 
Empire caused a further reduction in the total government revenues2.
The Ottoman fiscal crisis which led to bankruptcy in 1876 and to the subsequent estab-
lishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881, was rooted in the lack of 
any central administration of the financial system. The first Minister of Finance was ap-
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1. INTRODUCTION
pointed only in the 1837 and had no responsibility for preparing the public budget, the 
first of which was published in 1863, or ensuring a balance between income and expendit-
ure: usually the Sultan's ministers jointly agreed on the sum to be allocated to each gov-
ernment department without rendering any kind of account to the Minister of Finance; 
furthermore, each ministry issued new bonds to pay for its own expenses as need arose, 
and corruption was widespread. Until 1880, there was no department of audit and ac-
count. Strictly dependent on this lack of organization were the following: a decentralized 
and inefficient tax collection system that caused large losses of revenues to the Treasury; 
an excessive amount of expenditures for the maintenance of the bureaucratic apparatus 
and for the private needs of the Sultan; an inefficiently high level of external indebted-
ness3.
The Ottoman government signed its first foreign loan agreement in 1854, soon after the 
start of the Crimean War. The high cost of the military campaign could not be met 
through the short-term fiscal expedients usually adopted to bridge the gap between reven-
ues and expenditure – such as the issue of paper money, the debasement of the currency 
and the borrowing at high interest from the financiers of Istanbul, the so called Bankers of 
Galata4.
After two decades of borrowing, the proceeds of which were used mostly for military ex-
penditure and for paying the principal and interest on the debt itself5, the government 
was forced to declare a moratorium in debt payments due to a nominal outstanding debt 
of nearly £252 millions of British pounds. The burden this imposed on Ottoman finances 
can be seen from the fact that, by the time of Abdul Hamid' s accession, total estimated 
revenues of the treasury made up around 9% of this amount6. In 1874-75 the annual 
charges to meet this debt amounted to over half of the regular revenues of the public 
budget and represented nearly 60% of the total expenditures7. 
The beginning of the reign of Abdul Hamid was marked by two main events: the bank-
ruptcy of 1876 and the Great Depression of 1873-1896. The bankruptcy itself was sparked 
by the Great Depression in two ways: first, the Great Depression led to the standstill of 
capital exports to the Ottoman state which could not arrange new loans for covering its 
3 Owen R., The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914, I. B. Tauris, London 
2002, pp. 107-108.
4 Id., pp. 100, 107.
5 Id., p. 105.
6 Birdal M., The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt, I. B. Tauris, New York 
2010, p. 54.
7 Blaisdell D. C., European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, AMS Press, New 
York 1966, pp. 76-77; Tezel Y. S., “Notes on the Consolidated Foreign Debt of the Otto-
man Empire: the servicing of the loans”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Rela-
tions, 1972, Table 1. 
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earlier debt payments; secondly, the Great Depression decreased the demand for Otto-
man agriculture, a sector crucial for fiscal drawing and exports, also used by the govern-
ment as a source of securities for borrowing.
Once the public debt was settled, Abdul Hamid and, later on, the Young Turks, realized 
that, to increase the state's revenues while not incurring further debts, the taxable capa-
city of the population had to be increased. The policy chosen was to promote economic 
growth, avoiding as much as possible any increase in the fiscal burden, and optimizing, by 
means of centralization, the system of tax collection8.
In particular, Abdul Hamid enacted a policy of free trade and supported agricultural pro-
duction and commerce by introducing reforms in the rural sector and by building trans-
portation facilities. By contrast, the Young Turks coupled a protectionist commercial 
policy with projects specifically aimed to lay down the foundations of a modern economic 
infrastructure.
Plagued with a chronic lack of domestic capital and budget balance, the only means for 
the Empire to raise the funds for implementing the reforms and for building an adequate 
infrastructure was to keep borrowing from external sources9.
My purpose is to illustrate briefly how the Ottoman government failed to get out of the ex-
ternal debt spiral that proved to be fatal to the Empire. To increase fiscal revenues, the 
Ottomans needed a stable inflow of funds to be invested in productivity-augmenting re-
forms, but the increasing external debt and military expenses left few resources available 
for implementing the same reforms, which in turn translated into additional difficulties in 
financing the public sector. This self-enforcing dynamics lies at the core of the Empire's 
final decline.
2. Revenues and expenditures
After the default and the subsequent settlement of the public debt under the supervision 
of the Ottoman Debt Administration (hereafter referred to as OPDA), Abdul Hamid and, 
later on, the Young Turks, sought to push further the reforms started with the Tanzimat. 
In fact, the total revenues increased from 5,600 in current Ottoman Liras in 1840-42 (at 
the beginning of the Tanzimat) to 16,000 in 1880-82 and 31,000 in 1913-14. In terms of 
taxation per-capita, the revenues increased from 0.22 in 1840-42 to 0.8 in 1880-82 and to 
1.41 in 1913-14. The growth rate of GDP per-capita for the Ottoman Empire was between 
8 Owen R., The Middle East in the World Economy, cit., p. 105.
9 Akarly E. D., “Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909”, Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 28, n. 3, 1992, p. 450; Owen R., The Middle East in the World 
Economy, cit., pp. 120-121.
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0 and 1 percent per year during the same period. The ratio between fiscal revenues and 
Ottoman GDP was 4.3 in 1840-42, 10.0 in 1880-82 and 11.7 in 1913-1410. Since the Otto-
man government was reluctant to increase tax rates, the increased fiscal pressure resulted 
mostly from more efficient means of tax collection. The long term annual rates of growth 
of Ottoman GDP per capita show that modern economic growth started in the Empire in 
the nineteenth century although these rates lagged behind those of industrializing higher 
income Western countries (Table 1). 
The time series for the disaggregated actual revenues and expenditures are available only 
from 1887 to 1912.  Before this date, only estimated values were collected. In this period, 
total expenditures of the Ottoman Empire rose at an average annual rate of 2.7% while 
total revenues grew at an average annual rate of 2.4%. Although the budgets of many state 
departments were cut substantially, increased expenditures, particularly for the army and 
servicing the external debt, left the treasury with a regular annual deficit. On the eve of 
the World War I, military expenditures constituted close to 40% of total government ex-
penditures; almost 30% of Ottoman expenditures were absorbed by servicing the external 
debt. Administrative expenditures (which rose steadily due to the deeper penetration of 
the government into the provinces), public welfare, and services consumed the remaining 
funds available to Ottoman government11 (Figure 1). 
 The actual data in the time series from 1887 to 1912 show that the main contribution to 
the revenues came from agriculture (tithe and animal tax) and from trade (custom duties 
on import, export, and transit.) Tithe revenues and animal taxes actually collected by the 
Ottoman Treasury rose respectively by 69% and 15% between 1887-88 and 1910-11, while, 
in the same period, revenues from customs duties increased by 144%12 (Figure 2).
10 Pamuk Ş., “The Evolution of Financial Institutions in the Ottoman Empire 1600-1914”, 
Financial History Review, vol. 11, 1, 2004, pp. 7-32; Id., “Estimating Economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820”, The Journal Economic History, vol.66, 2006 , 
pp. 809-828.
11 Owen R., The Middle East in the World Economy, cit., p. 197 (Table 37); Shaw S. J., 
“Ottoman Expenditures and Budgets in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Cen-
turies”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 9, 1978, pp. 373-8; Id., “The 
Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System”, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 6, 1975, pp. 421-459; Shaw S. J. - Shaw E. K., His-
tory of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge pp. 225-226, 285-286; Pamuk Ş., The Ottoman Empire and European 
capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade investment and production, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1987, p. 61.
12 Pamuk Ş., The Ottoman Empire and European capitalism, cit., p. 238.
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3. Taxation of trade 
With respect to the taxation of trade we can begin to say that from 1840 to 1913, Ottoman 
exports measured in current prices increased more than five times, while imports expan-
ded six and half times13. The ratio of foreign trade to GDP raised from 9% in the 1840-42, 
to 21% in 1880-82 and to 29% in 1913-14. During this last period, foodstuffs and raw ma-
terials accounted for over 90% of Ottoman exports, whereas two-thirds of imports con-
sisted of manufactured goods. One-quarter of total agricultural production was exported, 
which means that domestic trade accounted for the remaining 75%14.
Since the Free Trade Treaties (1838-1841) with Britain and other European countries, the 
commercial policy of the Ottoman Empire had been characterized by free-trade which en-
dured the entire reign of Abdul Hamid. In exchange for the opening of Ottoman markets, 
Europeans ensured military support to the Empire. The commercial treaties established 
and accelerated the trend for which the Ottomans imported mainly finished European 
goods and exported chiefly raw materials and foodstuffs (cereals but also cash crops).
The Treaties fixed the tariffs (ad valorem) on exports at 12% and on imports at 5%. Do-
mestic merchants were subjected to the internal custom duty of 8%, while foreign mer-
chants were exempted from it15. This resulted in an expansion of Ottoman external trade 
and in manufacturing decline under the competition of industrial imports: starting first in 
the coastal areas, the decline spread to the interior due to the development of the rail-
ways.
In response the international competition for agricultural products, duties on exports 
were gradually reduced to 1% in 1869 and remained at that level until World War I. Under 
the pressure of budgetary deficits and complaints from manufacturers, the Ottoman gov-
ernment changed its tax rates in 1860-1. Duties on imports were raised to 8% in 1861 and 
to 11% in 1907, but this measure neither halted the decline of domestic industry nor en-
riched the Ottoman Treasury. In fact, the additional revenues were devoted to the Public 
Debt Administration which would use 25% of them to pay off the debts of the Ottoman 
government. Under the request of the Europeans powers, the remaining 75% would be 
used to finance reform projects in the Macedonian provinces.16
As most of the agricultural production was traded internally, the Ottoman government re-
lied more on domestic rather than foreign trade to obtain a stable flow of revenues. This 
explains why duties on overland commerce were abolished only in 1874 and duties on the 
13 Id., p. 23.
14 Id., pp. 17, 26.
15 Issawi C., The Economic History of Turkey, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1980, p. 76.
16 Akarly E. D., “Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey”, cit., pp. 454-456. 
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maritime transport of most cereals were removed in 189417. 
From the Young Turks Revolution until the end of the Empire, the Ottomans implemen-
ted a more protectionist policy: internal duties were totally removed in 1909; duties on 
imports were raised to 15% in 1914 and in 1916 the uniform ad valorem tax was replaced 
by differentiated specific duties (with rates of 8% for foodstuffs and raw materials, 12% 
for partly manufactured goods and 16% for wholly manufactured good), but it was “too 
late, as it turned out, to help the Treasury and still too little to afford meaningful protec-
tion for Ottoman manufacturers”18. During the Allied occupation of Istanbul, a return to 
pre-war tariffs' conditions was decreed, but this decree was denounced by the revolution-
ary government. Under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the regime of capitulations was 
abolished, the free trade treaties were discontinued and Turkey was allowed to maintain 
the 1916 tariff with adjustment for currency changes, until 1929, at which time it would 
have full tariff autonomy19.
4. Taxation of agriculture
In regard to taxation in the agricultural sector, it should first be stressed that agricultural 
production constituted the primary source of revenues for the Ottoman treasury. 
Throughout its history, the Ottoman Empire remained an agrarian economy and the bulk 
of the population, usually 80-90%, lived on and drew sustenance from the land, mostly in 
family holdings rather than large estates. In 1914, agriculture contributed 56% of Otto-
man national income20. 
Whether the growth in tithe revenues was chiefly due to the increase in agricultural pro-
duction or to a reduction in the share accruing to the tax collectors or to higher tax rates is 
a matter for debate21. 
We can safely exclude that higher revenues were driven by increases in tax rates. After the 
Tanzimat Decree of 1839, the tithe was fixed at 10% of the gross agricultural output and 
remained fairly stable as the government did not intend to increase the fiscal burden of 
the peasant class, though the tax rate was raised temporarily during the Great Depression 
17 Quataert D., “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914”, in H. İnalcik – D. Quataert, An Eco-
nomic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1997, pp. 825-827.
18 Id., p. 827.
19 Issawi C., An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, New York 1982, p. 22; Pamuk Ş., “The Ottoman Economy in World War 
I”, in S. Broadberry – M. Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War I, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge pp. 112-136. 
20 Quataert D., “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914”, cit., p. 845.
21 Pamuk Ş., The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, cit., pp. 89, 240-241.
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and World War I.
The scant statistics on production reveal very similar patterns to those shown by the tithe 
data suggesting that the improved taxable capacity of the rural population was by far a 
consequence of increasing production. Several factors – on the demand side, internal and 
external, and the supply side – help explain the growth in production. Demographic 
growth due to immigration, higher fertility, and lower mortality boosted the local demand 
of agricultural products; major cities – particularly, port cities – expanded considerably, 
providing larger markets for commercially traded agricultural goods and contributing to 
reduce the share of self-consumption. On the external demand side, a stronger foreign de-
mand for Ottoman products drove increasing exports.   
On the supply side, the Ottoman government adopted several measures to  enhance pro-
duction and productivity: (1) a program of compulsory sedentarization of nomads and 
their conversion into cultivators, which enlarged the labour supply, resulting in additional 
agricultural production; (2) better transportation facilities and a more developed infra-
structure; (3) the establishment of model farms; (4) the encouragement of cash crops cul-
tivation through distribution of seeds and experiments with improved machinery22; (5) 
the provision of technical assistance to the farmers; (6) the supply of cheap credit to peas-
ants through the foundation in 1881 of the Agricultural Bank, the only indigenous bank 
until the twentieth century. In particular, this bank is proof of governmental efforts to fin-
ance economic modernization from internal savings: bank profits were to fund the Otto-
man agricultural reform program. Nevertheless, the history of the bank clearly delineates 
the dilemma of Ottoman economic reform caught between the need for long-term devel-
opment and the overriding urgency of immediate financial obligations. The state, in fact, 
borrowed heavily from the bank to resolve recurrent financial difficulties, using the 
profits originally devoted to the agricultural reforms23. 
However, most of the increase in agricultural production derived from bringing additional 
land under cultivation. In this regard, the role of the state was crucial because of the pro-
mulgation of the 1858 Land Code, one of the pillars of the Tanzimat reforms whose long-
term effects on fiscal revenues are evident in the period under consideration.
First and foremost, the Code secured private title to the land for those peasants who 
maintained the land under cultivation and paid taxes regularly. By asserting the property 
rights of the peasantry, the Code promoted the extension of cultivated land and new in-
22 Quataert D., “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914”, cit., pp. 852-853. 
23 Id., cit., p. 872; Id., “Dilemma of development: The Agricultural Bank and Agricultural 
Reform in Ottoman Turkey, 1888-1908”, International Journal of Middle East Stud-
ies, 6, 1975, pp. 210-227; Owen R., The Middle East in the World Economy, cit., pp. 
117-118.
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vestments which resulted in increased productivity and more revenues for the Treasury. 
Secondly, the Code contributed to fiscal centralization by the institution of the Cadaster, 
which was instrumental to taxing a higher percentage of agricultural producers. The gov-
ernment's attempts to centralize tithe collection by replacing tax farming with direct col-
lection by salaried state employees were instead unsuccessful24. 
Yet, in the long run, thanks to the indirect promotion of cooperation between notables, 
who acted as local tax-farmers, and peasants, the positive effects of the Land Code on 
tithe revenues more than compensated the inefficiency arising from the decentralized sys-
tem of tithe collection.
In actual fact, the definition of property rights on peasant land introduced by the Land 
Code persuaded local notables to give up over-taxation of the peasants and to consider the 
lands under their fiscal control according to long-term interests. The new legal setting 
made it more profitable for the local notables to grant loans to peasants and provided the 
same peasants with the correct incentives to use these funds to finance new investments 
and to act as small land-holders. Because of the increased volume of production, the not-
ables were able to collect additional agricultural products to be commercialized in local 
markets and over long-distance trade routes. The fiscal benefit for the Ottoman central 
government was twofold: (1) higher bids in tax farming auctions from the capitalized 
value of higher agricultural productivity and (2) increased revenues from the duties on ex-
ports of agricultural products25.
5. Balancing the budget: the role of the OPDA
Although tax base rose during the period under consideration, the additional revenues 
were insufficient to balance the budget deficit. After the default, the Ottoman government 
still depended on foreign capital for financing the reform projects. And every time a new 
loan was issued, it was backed by new guarantees consisting in more fiscal sources ceded 
to the OPDA for serving the public debt. On the eve of the World War I, roughly one third 
of the government revenues had been under the control of the OPDA26.
The OPDA was established in 1881 by the Decree of Muharrem, as a separate Ottoman 
Treasury, to put an end to the acute financial difficulties of the Ottoman Empire through a 
reduction of almost 50% on the outstanding nominal debt but at the price of greater for-
24 Quataert D., “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914”, cit., pp. 854-856.
25 Ecchia S., Sviluppo economico e innovazioni istituzionali nel distretto di Haifa sul  
finire dell'Impero Ottomano (1890-1915), Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 2008, 
pp. 268-269; 306-319.
26 Birdal M., The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt, cit., p. 7. 
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eign financial control27.
The OPDA consisted of a seven-men council composed of the representatives of the six 
main national groups of bondholders - one each from France, Germany, Austria, Italy and 
the Ottoman government itself, and one representing both England and Holland  - while a 
seventh was the delegate of the Ottoman Bank that held some specific bonds. The coun-
cil's activity aimed at the direct administration of the revenues ceded to the service of the 
public debt until its liquidation. These revenues included some of the main indirect con-
tributions of the Ottoman Treasury (the salt monopoly, the stamp and spirit duties, the 
fish tax and the silk tithe for a number of districts) and the tributes from several 
provinces. Initially, the OPDA also collected the tobacco tax but in 1883 it farmed this out 
to a foreign agency, La Société de la Régie Cointeressé des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottomane, 
for a fixed annual sum and a share of the profits. Within a few years, the OPDA was given 
the collection of many other revenues set aside specifically for the servicing of new foreign 
loans and the provision of financial guarantees to foreign railway promoters. On behalf of 
the Ottoman Ministry of Finance itself, the OPDA was also responsible for the direct col-
lection of the customs surtax of 3% imposed in 190728. 
The OPDA also influenced the monetary policy of the Empire that was basically driven by 
the need to supplement financial policy. In 1881, the representatives of the bondholders 
made it clear that to retain its access to the European financial markets, the Ottoman gov-
ernment would need to move from bimetallism, adopted in 1844, to gold standard. The 
imperial government accepted the OPDA's request as the external debt was denominated 
in gold and staying outside the gold standard would have dramatically raised the financial 
burden, also negatively impacting on the inflows of foreign capital. Otherwise, a fixed par-
ity between the leading European currencies and the Ottoman lira would have provided 
commerce, capital movements and direct foreign investments with stability and secur-
ity29.
The foundation of OPDA in 1881 marks a divide in the financial history of the late Otto-
man Empire, before and after the bankruptcy30. The most important feature of the first 
period, from 1854 to 1875, was the large volume of borrowing and the increasingly unfa-
vourable terms of loans (even in comparison with the terms under which other non-
27 Blaisdell D. C., European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, cit., pp. 89-99.
28 Id., pp. 94-97, 108-120, chapter 6; Owen R., The Middle East in the World Economy, 
cit., p. 193.
29 Pamuk Ş., “From Bimetallism to the Limping Gold Standard: The Ottoman Monetary 
System in the Nineteenth Century”, in Cottrell P. L. (ed.), East Meets West – Banking, 
Commerce and Investment in the Ottoman Empire, Ashgate, Aldershot 2008, pp. 11-
24. 
30 For a detailed analysis of foreign capital flows  see Pamuk Ş, The Ottoman Empire and 
European Capitalism, cit., chapter 4. 
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European governments borrowed in European financial markets during the same 
period)31. During the years 1882-1913 there was the reversal in the direction of net funds 
flows as a result of European financial control. Debt payments were more than twice the 
amount of fund inflows from external borrowing. At the same time, this close financial 
control reduced the risk associated with new Ottoman bond issues in European financial 
markets, lowering rates on new borrowing. The years 1882-1913 can be further divided 
into two sub-periods, 1882-1901 and 1902-1913. Given that in both periods debt payments 
exceeded inflows from new borrowing by a large margin, new borrowing remained limited 
until 1901. This early period was relatively peaceful for the Empire. Budgetary deficits 
began to grow once again after the turn of the century due to military expenditures. By the 
early 1910s, Ottoman finances had returned to the stage before bankruptcy: only because 
of the outbreak of World War I, another default did not take place32 (Table 2). 
The effect of the OPDA on the Ottoman efforts to balance the budget is debated. Though 
regarded as the outpost of the European financial imperialism and as a means to seize 
some of the major Ottoman fiscal sources33, the Ottoman fiscal policy benefited from the 
new institution under several aspects. First, the OPDA's administrative policies yielded 
significant increases in the revenues obtained from indirect contributions: 176% over the 
30 years following its establishment34. Initially, the Decree of Muharrem prevented the 
Ottoman Government from obtaining any share of the revenues collected by the Adminis-
tration, however they might be increased35. But with the amendment of 1903, the max-
imum amount permitted for the repayment of the pre-1881 debt was annually fixed, leav-
ing any surplus to be divided between government and OPDA in the ratio 75:25. The pos-
itive effect of this amendment on the Ottoman revenues is evident, as they increased at 
higher rate just after 190336 (Figure 3).
31 For a comparison, see Wynne W. H., State insolvency and Foreign Bondholders, vol. 
II, New Haven 1951.
32 By the end of the Empire, the Ottoman debt amounted to 161 millions of gold Turkish 
Liras. With the Lausanne Peace Conference the Ottoman external debt was renegoti-
ated and apportioned to all successor states. Suvla R., “Debts during the Tanzimat 
period”, in C. Issawi (ed.), The economic History of the Middle East, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1966, p. 106. 
33 Morawitz C., Les finances de la Turquie, Guillaumin, Paris 1902;  Roumani, Essai his-
torique et technique sur la Dette Publique Ottomane, M. Giard, Paris 1927;  Blaisdell, 
European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, cit.; Du Velay, Essai sur l'His-
toire Financière de la Turquie, cit. See also, Eldem E., “Ottoman Financial Integration 
with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt”, 
European Review, 13, 2005, pp. 431-445.
34 Birdal M., The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt, cit., p. 106.
35 Blaisdell D. C., European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, cit., pp. 97-99; 
Ducruet J., Les capitaux européens au Proche-Orient, Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris 1964, p. 104. 
36 In exchange for this concession, the OPDA secured a stronger involvement of the Otto-
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Second, the discipline of the OPDA made order in the Empire's finance, functioning as a 
model of efficient fiscal and financial management and as a main contributor to the mod-
ernization of state entrepreneurship which was to form the future backbone of the early 
republican economy37.
Third, the credibility of the OPDA reduced the risk associated with bond emission, lower-
ing rates on borrowing, increasing the value of  shares in the public debt as quoted on the 
major financial markets38 and creating a safer environment for new foreign loans and 
European investments directed mainly to infrastructure such as railroads and ports with 
the purpose of expanding trade between Europe and the Ottoman Empire39.
According to the aims of Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks, these investments were to 
foster the recovery of the Ottoman economy. The railroads, in particular, by reducing 
costs of transportation between the interior and the major ports and urban markets, could 
open up uncultivated lands to agriculture making the price of the grain of these regions 
more competitive. This resulted in additional tithe and customs revenues for the central 
government. 
The flip side of the benefits from OPDA's administration was an increased temptation for 
the government to act on moral hazard, a problem that could lie at the core of the endur-
ing budget difficulties experienced by the Ottoman Empire. The valuable guarantee and 
credibility offered to the European investors by the OPDA, not to mention the surpluses 
that were ceded to the Empire after the 1903, lowered the incentives for the Ottoman gov-
ernment to implement a more vigorous policy of reform in the financial and fiscal sectors 
and made easier to go on recklessly contracting new foreign debts, which almost led again 
to bankruptcy40.
man government in preventing contraband traffic of goods like salt, avoiding a poten-
tial loss of revenues. Until then, the Ottoman government's action against smuggling 
had been rather ineffective since it would have taken costly measures without  any 
profit. Morawitz C., Les Finances de la Turquie, cit., pp. 273-275. 
37 Birdal M., The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt, cit., pp. 8-9. For example, 
among the financial innovations introduced by the OPDA, the author underlines  the 
introduction of the double entry bookkeeping to state accounting that was later adop-
ted by the Ottoman government as the standard accounting principle.
38 According to Owen, due to the most favourable terms of the loans, out of the total 
nominal sum borrowed between 1854 and 1874 (£T241,900,000) the Ottoman gov-
ernment only actually obtained just over half (£T127,570,000) while, out of the 
£T166,000,000 borrowed during the period 1881 to 1914, the government itself re-
ceived £T147,000,000 or 89%. Owen R., The Middle East in the World Economy, cit., 
p. 104, p. 194; Suvla R., “Debts during the Tanzimat Period”, cit., p. 104-106. 
39 Pamuk Ş., The Ottoman Empire and European capitalism, cit., pp. 55-56; Cottrell P. 
L., “A Survey of European Investment in Turkey, 1854-1914: Banks and the Finance of 
the State and Railway Construction”, in  P. L. Cottrell (ed.), East Meets West – Bank-
ing, Commerce and Investment in the Ottoman Empire, cit., pp. 59-96.
40 Blaisdell, D. C., European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, cit., pp. 38-39. 
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It is also questionable whether the Ottoman Empire actually benefited from the massive 
inflow of foreign funds promoted by the OPDA in the railroad sector. On the one hand, 
tithe collection in provinces with railroads did in fact rise faster than elsewhere. On the 
other hand, these additional revenues could not cover the kilometric guarantee payments 
to foreign railroad companies. Moreover, in the same places reached by railroads, most of 
the local pre-industrial manufacturing activity was destroyed by the competition from 
European manufactures41. 
6. Conclusions
The reformist policies of Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks succeeded in introducing ef-
ficient Western institutions (property rights, state cadaster, gold standard to name a few) 
that provided certainty for economic activity and incentives to invest. These institutional 
innovations can be seen as the fundamental determinants of the economic growth in the 
late Ottoman period. Together with increased trade and direct foreign investments, they 
resulted in a deeper integration of the Empire in the world economy and led to a stable 
rate of growth in per-capita GDP, especially in those Eastern Mediterranean regions 
strongly linked to world trade42. The best performing institutions were those promoting 
an export-oriented, primary producing economy. Indeed, most of the growth in per capita 
output during this period was due to increases in agricultural output and exports. The late 
Ottoman economic growth has been described as agriculture or agricultural export – led 
growth43. 
Though the tax base rose during the period under review, these additional resources were 
According to Owen, “the suspicion must remain that even the reformers themselves 
were not always completely serious, that their projects were often designed primarily 
to impress potential European donors”, in Owen R., The Middle East in the World 
Economy, cit., p. 108. The same point of view is shared by Davison R. H., Reform in 
the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963, p. 80.
41 Owen R., The Middle East in the World Economy, cit., pp. 197, 214 (Table 46); Pamuk 
Ş., The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, cit., p. 134. 
42 Pamuk Ş., “Estimating Economic Growth”, cit., p. 823: Id., “The Evolution of Financial 
Institutions in the Ottoman Empire”, cit., pp. 7-32.
43 Id., “Sources of long-term economic growth for Turkey, 1880-2005”, European Re-
view of Economic History, 12, 2008, pp. 393-430; Id, “Economic Growth and Institu-
tional Change in Turkey before 1980”, in T. Çetin – F. Yilmaz (eds.), Understanding 
the Process of Economic Change in Turkey, Nova Science Publishers, 2010, pp. 15-30; 
Id., “Agriculture and economic development in Turkey, 1870-2000”, in P. Lains and V. 
Pinilla (eds.), Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870, Rout-
ledge Publishers 2008, pp. 375-96; Id., “The Ottoman Economy in World War I”, in S. 
Broadberry – M. Harrison (eds.), The Economics of War World I,  Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge 2005, pp. 112-136.
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insufficient to balance the chronic budget deficit that remained the Achilles' heel of the 
Empire. Despite such financial problems, an overall judgement on the economic policy of 
Abdul Hamid II and the Young Turks cannot be formulated without accounting for the 
substantial discontinuity in the economic policy occurring after the bankruptcy. While in 
the preceding period the Ottoman government borrowed to cover mostly unproductive 
expenditures, Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks were more aware of the necessity to im-
plement radical economic reforms and borrowed funds to improve the productive capa-
city of the Empire.
This change of attitude towards the national economy testifies a tendency which was to be 
a founding trait of the new Turkish state. In the following decades, the Republic would 
carry the burden of the late Ottoman debt, but would also enjoy the benefits of the corres-
ponding investments44.
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